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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Not long after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

These divergent actions highlights the core principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and stopping hostilities—though how this squares with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative reinforced this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This pivot is consequential, but analysts note it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Strains

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has developed with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Selective Intervention

An analogous confrontation flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

Similar to Competitors

Experts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.